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This brief has been funded by the Economic and Social Research Council’s UK in a Changing 
Europe programme, which highlights the major challenges and opportunities of Brexit across 
the UK. It is based on interviews and workshops with a wide range of stakeholders1 held in 
December 2017 and July 2018 on the options available for future Northern Irish and UK 
environmental governance, as well as the growing body of parliamentary evidence, academic 
publications and think tank reports on these issues.   
 
 
 
  
                                               
1 Workshop stakeholders included representatives from local and devolved government, public agencies, 
environmental NGOs, rural and farming organisations, and the energy sector. 
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Executive Summary 
Brexit represents a major change to environmental governance in Northern Ireland and the 
UK. Yet it is occurring at a time when Northern Ireland has no government, curtailing its 
ability to engage in both local and UK-wide preparations. Northern Irish stakeholders are 
worried that tensions between England and Scotland are dominating Brexit preparations, 
hampering discussions of UK-wide cooperation, as well as of the specific needs of Northern 
Ireland. They are concerned pre-existing environmental governance issues in the region (such 
as the lack of an independent environmental agency or the prevalence of cross-border 
environmental crime) will remain unaddressed, and that current North/South cooperation on 
environmental issues will be negatively impacted by the Brexit deal. Crucially, the key planks 
of the UK government’s ‘Green Brexit’ strategy (such as the commitments laid out in the 25 
Year Environment Plan and the Environmental Principles and Governance consultation) do 
not cover the devolved nations. This raises the prospect of further policy divergence and 
inconsistent implementation and enforcement across the UK, and for Northern Ireland’s 
environment to continue deteriorating.   
Key Points 
x Northern Ireland is in many ways a unique case for post-Brexit environmental 
governance: it has extensive cooperation with Ireland on environmental issues and the 
Irish border is a key issue in Brexit negotiations. However, the lack of a Northern 
Ireland Executive means that its concerns are not strongly represented in cross-UK 
discussions. 
x Northern Ireland has long lagged behind the UK (and most of the EU) in terms of the 
quality of its environmental governance. As a result, strategies to address post-Brexit 
governance gaps in Northern Ireland must also consider pre-existing domestic 
governance weaknesses. 
x An independent environment agency should be established as a matter of urgency (to 
further align Northern Ireland with best practice in environmental governance) and a 
separate environment commissioner should be appointed who can participate in a 
UK-wide environmental watchdog. 
x Common UK environmental frameworks must be created. There should be a 
presumption in favour of transparent legislative frameworks underpinned by common 
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standards and principles to avoid gaps in implementation and to create the conditions 
for successful policy coordination and cooperation.   
x These common frameworks must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate continued 
cooperation between Northern Ireland and Ireland on a North/South basis under the 
umbrella of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in policy areas such as water quality, 
waste management, electricity generation, animal welfare etc.  
x This flexibility must be underpinned by an intra-UK non-regression principle, 
irrespective of what is agreed with the EU. This would enable each nation to diverge 
upward, while preventing an internal ‘race to the bottom’ within the UK. 
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1. Introduction
Over the last forty years, UK environmental policy and systems of governance have been 
profoundly shaped by the UK’s membership of the European Union. While EU-UK influence 
was not a one-way process (the UK pushed for greater ambition on climate change and 
blocked the adoption of environmental taxes), EU membership prompted the UK to adopt a 
‘more preventative approach to policy, with fixed standards and clearer timetables of 
improvement, and an explicit set of guiding principles such as precaution, prevention and 
sustainability.’2  
Brexit thus poses profound questions for UK environmental policy. What will happen to EU 
standards, intended to be carried over into UK law through the EU Withdrawal Act, without 
the underpinning EU system of governance? Will these standards become ‘zombie 
legislation’, present on the statute book but without proper enforcement?3 Or will the UK 
government’s proposed ‘Green Brexit’ lead to a revolution in how the environment is 
governed, ensuring that post-Brexit ‘governance gaps’ are not only filled, but addressed in 
such a way to make the UK a world leader in environmental affairs?  
Brexit will not only change relations between the UK and the EU. Within the UK, the influx of 
competences repatriated from the EU level also raises questions for the devolved and UK 
governments. Who should be ‘taking back control’? Is Brexit an opportunity for policy 
divergence not only vis-à-vis the EU but between the UK’s four nations?4 These questions are 
particularly salient for environmental issues.  
Environmental policy is heavily Europeanised and has been devolved to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland since the late 1990s. Environmental problems are also notoriously difficult to 
address within national borders. Environmental problems—such as water pollution, 
biodiversity loss and climate change—have transboundary effects and require cooperation to 
tackle them (in this case, both within the UK and between the UK and the EU).    
This brief is part of a series analysing the challenges for environmental governance after 
Brexit in the UK, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
                                               
2 Burns, C., Jordan, A., Gravey, V., Berny, N., Bulmer, S., Carter, N., Cowell, R., Dutton, J., Moore, B., Oberthür, 
S., Owens, S., Rayner, T., Scott, J. and Stewart, B, 2016. The EU referendum and the UK environment: An 
expert review.  
3 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 2017. The future of the natural environment after the 
EU referendum. Sixth Report of Session 2016–17. HC 599. 
4 Reid, C., 2017. Brexit and the devolution dynamics. Environmental Law Review, 19 (1): 3–5.  
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“Northern Ireland is central 
to the Brexit negotiations, 
yet with no government to 
handle Brexit preparations.” 
It focuses on Northern Ireland, a region which 
occupies a paradoxical place in the Brexit process. 
Northern Ireland and the Irish border have 
become major issues in the EU-UK negotiations. 
At the same time, Northern Ireland as an actor is 
absent in the domestic preparations (there has 
been no devolved government since January 2017, 
and direct rule has not been instituted). The lack of a Northern Irish government in Stormont 
is problematic for Brexit negotiations in general. For example, as a net food exporter, 
Northern Ireland is likely to have very different trade priorities from England, Scotland and 
Wales. But this situation also raises two additional issues for environmental governance. First, 
Northern Ireland has long lagged behind the UK (and most of the EU) in terms of the quality 
of its environmental governance. As a result, strategies to address post-Brexit governance 
gaps in Northern Ireland must also consider pre-existing domestic governance weaknesses. 
Second, the region faces additional, distinct, cross-border and all-island environmental 
challenges that it shares with Ireland—such as how to tackle pollution or invasive species that 
affect both jurisdictions. Every form of Brexit, from a soft Brexit to a hard, unplanned exit, will 
have impacts on the environment and on how much the UK continues cooperating with its 
EU neighbours.5 But the ways in which the Irish border dilemma is solved (or not)—from 
full/partial regulatory alignment between the UK and the EU, to a hardened Irish border or 
increased checks in the Irish Sea—will impact Northern Ireland first and foremost. This is likely 
to have consequences for environmental governance too—shaping cooperation across the 
island of Ireland as well as policy divergence within the UK. 
This brief discusses challenges and opportunities for post-Brexit environmental governance 
in Northern Ireland. It starts by discussing the issues facing environmental governance in 
Northern Ireland before Brexit. It then analyses the challenges posed by Brexit and how the 
region is preparing, before debating options for Northern Irish environmental governance 
after Brexit and how the rest of the UK can learn from this unique case. 
                                               
5 Burns, C., Jordan, A. and Gravey, V., 2016. The EU referendum and the UK environment: The future under a 
‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ Brexit; Burns, C., Gravey, V. and Jordan, A., 2018. UK environmental policy post-Brexit: A risk 
analysis. A report for Friends of the Earth, p. 40. 
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2. Governance before Brexit: 
Overcoming Systemic 
Failures?
For over twenty years, devolution of environmental competences has given the three 
devolved nations the opportunity to develop their own approaches to environmental policy. 
In line with the EU Treaties, EU environmental policy provides a baseline—offering the 
possibility for EU Member States (or regions within them) to go beyond the minimum 
standards set at EU level. This has been the case for example in Wales, (as evidenced by the 
2015 Wellbeing of Future Generations Act) and Scotland (which is leading the way on 
renewable energy, and more recently, on banning single-use plastics). This, critically, has not 
been the case in Northern Ireland. A number of reviews of environmental governance in 
Northern Ireland over the last twenty years have concluded that the region is lagging behind 
the rest of the UK, experiencing ‘the relegation of environmental concerns down the list of 
political imperatives’ which is often found in post-conflict societies.6 Common issues include 
the lack of an independent environmental agency, the absence of an environmental audit 
committee in the NI Assembly, and the lack of a specific environmental tribunal or at least 
environmental experts within the judiciary and prosecution services.7 
These limited enforcement and oversight capacities, together with a focus on economic 
development after the Troubles and a lack of political support for environmental ambition, 
have led to ‘a systemic failure to regulate environmentally harmful activities’.8 This failure is 
illustrated by frequent reports of environmental crimes, from quarrying taking place without 
proper planning permission or environmental impact assessments, to (often cross-border) 
waste crimes (illegal dumping of waste in bogs, rivers, fields) and fuel laundering. The recent 
Renewable Heat Incentive scandal—which saw the Northern Ireland Executive greatly 
                                               
6 Brennan, C., Purdy, R. and Hjerp, P., 2017. Political, economic and environmental crisis in Northern Ireland: 
The true cost of environmental governance failures and opportunities for reform. Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly, p. 125. 
7 Macrory, R., 2004. Transparency and trust: Reshaping environmental governance in Northern Ireland, p. 72; 
Burke, T., Bell, G. and Turner, S., 2007. Foundations for the future: The review of environmental governance, 
p. 118. 
8 Brennan, C., Purdy, R. and Hjerp, P., 2017. Political, economic and environmental crisis in Northern Ireland: 
The true cost of environmental governance failures and opportunities for reform. Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly, p. 134. 
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overspend on a badly-designed renewable energy scheme that generously subsidised the 
use of wood pellet burners with few controls—is one of many environmental governance 
scandals in Northern Ireland, which often spill over to the Irish side of the border.9 
2.1 Cross-border environmental crime 
Cross-border environmental crimes have two negative consequences for Northern Ireland. 
First, environmental crimes undermine NI’s natural environment (central to a current boom in 
tourism) with concerns that ongoing environmental damages may be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to offset. Second, in a resource-poor environment, environmental crimes are 
particularly costly to address, further limiting the availability of public funding for 
environmental action. Hence, these crimes represent a loss in tax revenue (on fuel, waste, 
etc.) as well as extremely high costs to repair the damages to the environment.  
Box 1: Cross-border environmental crimes 
Different rules and costs for waste management between Ireland and Northern Ireland 
have fuelled waste smuggling in the past. A price-hike for landfill costs in Ireland in the 
early 2000s led to an estimated 250,000 tonnes of waste being illegally dumped in 
Northern Ireland. A cross-border repatriation plan established under the auspices of the 
2006 EU Shipment of Waste Regulation was to be completed by 2018.10 However, illegal 
waste disposal continues on both sides of (and across) the border with enforcement once 
more lagging behind. A review in 2013 of illegal waste at the Mubuoy site in 
Derry/Londonderry (on the Northern Ireland side of the border)  found it contained over 
900,000 m3 of illegal waste.11 On the Irish side, the Carndonagh tyre dump is the largest in 
Europe, with over 16 million tyres illegally disposed of, most of which come from NI.12 
Beyond waste, unclear responsibilities over Lough Foyle and Carlingford Lough (as the 
Irish border is not settled) is leading to unregulated economic activity with damaging 
environmental impacts (e.g. an increase from 2,000 to 30,000 Oyster beds in Lough Foyle 
between 2014 and 2016).13 
                                               
9 BBC, 2017. Renewable Heat Initiative Timeline.  
10 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service, 2016. Background paper on waste 
management in Northern Ireland, p. 18. 
11 Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs, n.d. The Mobuoy Road Waste 
Project. 
12 Village Magazine, 2018. Island of Tyreland. Highland Radio, 2018. 16 million tyres could be illegally buried in 
North Inishowen. 
13 BBC News, 2016. Lough Foyle oyster farms cashing in on political deadlock. 
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A recent review commissioned by the NI environmental sector found that ‘the cost to the UK 
taxpayer in lost taxes from Northern Ireland could be as much as £80 million annually for 
illegal fuel laundering, £2 million annually for illegal quarrying, and we estimate (to date) that 
it could be between £100 and £150 million for illegal waste disposal’.14 As for cleaning illegal 
waste, this same review found that it would cost up to £440 million. 
2.2 Cross-border and all-island environmental cooperation  
Formal and informal cooperation on environmental issues between Northern Ireland and 
Ireland has grown over the last twenty years. This can take a cross-border form—focused on 
local cooperation in the border region—or instead take shape through an all-island strategy. 
Table 1: Cross-border and all-island areas of environmental cooperation between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland.  
Cross-border areas of cooperation 
x Environmental funding 
x Fuel laundering 
x Marine environment 
x Protected habitats 
x Strategic Environmental 
Assessments 
x Waste and waste crime 
x Water catchments 
x Water pollution and regulation 
x Wildfires 
All-island areas of cooperation 
x Air quality 
x Birds and Habitats Directives 
x Climate change 
x Energy supply 
x Invasive species 
x Marsh fritillary 
x Plant health 
x Pollinator Plan 
x Radiation 
Source: Northern Ireland Environment Link, 2017. 
The environment is one of six areas of cooperation identified under the 1998 Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement (GFA). The North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) set up by the 
GFA thus includes environmental cooperation within its remit and has overseen joint efforts 
on tackling waste crime, cooperating on managing shared water resources, and sharing 
information on available funding and research opportunities.15 
                                               
14 Purdy, R. and Hjerp, P., 2016. Environmental governance in Northern Ireland: Identifying the drivers for 
change and considering solutions, p. 6.  
15 North South Ministerial Council, 2016. North South Ministerial Council Environment meeting: Joint 
communiqué.  
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Institutional cooperation between the two jurisdictions also goes beyond the NSMC. This 
cooperation includes specific cross-border agencies (such as the Loughs Agency on cross-
border marine/fisheries issues), frequent cooperation between the NI Environment Agency 
(NIEA) and the Irish Environment Protection Agency (EPA) to jointly implement EU 
environmental directives (e.g. cooperation on international water catchments for the Water 
Framework Directive and joint reporting under the Birds Directive and Habitats Directive) and 
ambitious all-island strategies that include city councils, government departments and 
agencies on both sides of the border (such as the All-Ireland Pollinator Plan). Cooperation 
extends beyond public actors, with, for example, environmental NGOs on both sides of the 
border putting together joint bids for European 
funding. 
In conclusion, the status quo in Northern Ireland 
offers some key lessons for (re)building environmental 
governance after Brexit.  
1. Common standards are not sufficient to 
guarantee equivalent high levels of 
environmental quality on the ground. Common 
EU rules have been enforced very differently 
across the UK and across the island of Ireland. Divergence creates opportunity. While 
this opportunity has been seized to achieve greater environmental ambitions in Wales 
and Scotland, it has meant lower ambition in NI and the development of 
environmental crime.  The risk of environmental crime increases further when 
responsibilities are unclear, as in Carlingford Lough and Lough Foyle where the 
position of the Irish border is not settled.  
2. Cooperation across jurisdictions is key to tackle these abuses.  Cross-border 
cooperation to address environmental damages or increase environmental benefits 
goes beyond state actors, with a wide network of civil society and public organisations 
involved in formal and informal cooperation. The four UK nations ‘going it alone’ on 
environmental policy risk mishandling cross-border challenges.  
3. Current systems of environmental governance are far from perfect. As Brennan et al. 
argue, ‘the problematic history of environmental governance in Northern Ireland 
demonstrates not only the power and influence of the EU’s enforcement architecture, 
“Northern Ireland has 
been left behind as the 
dirty corner of the 
former ‘Dirty Man of 
Europe’” 
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but also some of its core weaknesses’.16 Northern Ireland has been left behind as the 
dirty corner of the former ‘Dirty Man of Europe’, using its status as a post-conflict 
society to argue for differential treatment from the European Commission and to 
resist calls for an independent environmental agency. While environmental 
infringement cases have been brought forward by the European Commission (6 were 
still ongoing in 2016) Northern Ireland has never been fined.17 Delivering ‘gold standard’ 
environmental governance in the future means taking a hard look at the weaknesses 
of the EU and domestic systems—and developing new models that address both. 
                                               
16 Brennan, C., Dobbs, M., Gravey, V. and Uì Bhroin, A., 2018. The future of environmental governance in 
Northern Ireland, p. 16.  
17 Purdy, R. and Hjerp, P., 2016. Environmental governance in Northern Ireland: Identifying the drivers for 
change and considering solutions.  
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3. Governance for Brexit: 
Preparation without 
Representation? 
While Brexit negotiations are led by the UK government and the European Commission, 
preparing for Brexit involves a much greater range of public and private actors. Ongoing 
preparations are proving highly political and divisive (who should ‘take back control’ and to 
what end?) and are putting strain on institutions that were not designed for this purpose.18  
3.1 Existing cooperation mechanisms 
Intra-UK cooperation exists both at sectoral level (between actors involved in environmental 
protection) and between central and devolved governments.  Specific environmental bodies 
such as the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) and the Climate Change 
Committee are UK-wide, advisory bodies. The JNCC, for example, brings together 
representatives from conservation bodies of the UK’s four nations.19 It provides advice and 
recommendations, is charged with establishing common standards across the UK for 
monitoring and researching nature conservation and analyses the resulting information. Its 
recommendations are then left to be implemented by the competent legislative authorities 
in each country.  The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) operates on a similar UK-wide 
basis. Such cooperation can extend beyond providing advice, thus the agencies responsible 
for helping to implement environmental policy across the UK (the Environment Agency, the 
Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, Natural Resources Wales and the Northern 
Ireland Environment Agency) have fora for cooperation.20 However, the perception of 
stakeholders is that cooperation is not well developed.   
The devolved nations and the UK government meet to discuss and coordinate ‘devolved’ and 
‘reserved’ powers in the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), which was created in 1999 to 
                                               
18 Thimont Jack, M., Owen, J., Paun, A., and J. Kellam, 2018. Devolution after Brexit: Managing the 
environment, agriculture and fisheries. Institute for Government. 
19 Joint Nature Conservation Committee, 2018. About JNCC. 
20 Northern Ireland does not have an independent environment agency, those functions are carried out by 
Northern Ireland’s Department for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs. 
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facilitate co-ordination between the UK government and the devolved governments.21 The 
JMC is comprised of a set of committees composed of ministers from the UK and devolved 
governments. It is designed to provide central co-ordination of the overall relationship 
between the UK and the devolved nations. The implementation of EU environmental law falls 
under the remit of the JMC (EU) formation.  
For Northern Ireland, two further cooperation mechanisms are important for both 
North/South and East/West cooperation: the North South Ministerial Council, which includes 
a specific environment and agriculture remit, and the British-Irish Council, which brings 
together the governments of the UK, Ireland, the Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey.22  
3.2 Institutions under strain 
These policy coordination mechanisms were designed to fit a system in which Northern 
Ireland and the other nations of the UK (and of the EU) were tied to common standards 
decided at the EU level. Brexit has highlighted some key limitations, especially in the 
operation of the JMC.  
JMC meetings are infrequent and irregular, and can only be convened when the UK 
government deems it necessary.23 The JMC on European Negotiations, set up to deal with 
Brexit has failed to meet on the planned monthly basis, and did not meet for 8 months 
between February and October 2017.24  The lack of regular engagement at the highest level 
has also contributed to a neglect of devolution issues in the Brexit debate and negotiations.25 
This neglect of devolution and intergovernmental cooperation can also be seen through 
engagement with the British-Irish Council. While all other parties are represented at Prime 
Minister level, neither Theresa May nor before her David Cameron have attended BIC 
meetings.26  
The current system of cooperation is largely informal and bilateral, with the devolved 
administrations dealing mostly with the UK government. The opportunity for all four UK 
                                               
21 United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland 
Executive Committee, 2013. Devolution: Memorandum of understanding and supplementary agreements. 
See also: Thimont Jack, M., Owen, J., Paun, A., and J. Kellam, 2018. Devolution after Brexit: Managing the 
environment, agriculture and fisheries. Institute for Government. 
22 Torrance, D., 2018. Intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom, p. 32. 
23 See Institute for Government, n.d. Devolution and the Joint Ministerial Committee; House of Lords 
European Union Committee, 2017. Brexit: Devolution.     
24 Institute for Government, n.d. Devolution and the Joint Ministerial Committee.   
25 Farstad, F., 2017. Green Gove woos environment sector: But what about devolution? Brexit & Environment 
Blog. 
26 Emerson, N., 2018. Neglecting the British-Irish Council is a terrible mistake. The Irish Times. 
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environmental ministers to meet and work together is rare. Similarly, there is no arrangement 
for joint working between the parliaments and assemblies of the UK’s four nations. This 
system of ‘below the radar’ cooperation worked well for technical matters.27 It has been 
further intensified with more in-depth working between the four administrations via civil 
service ‘deep dives’ to discuss where common frameworks are necessary and what legal form 
they would take.28 Fisheries, environment and agriculture are central to these exercises. At 
least 30 ‘deep dive’ exercises had been completed by April 2018, addressing all areas in which 
common legislative frameworks are planned.29  
But political and constitutional tensions between the Scottish and UK government have seen 
these technical discussions slow down, waiting for a resolution in front of the UK Supreme 
Court in the autumn. Furthermore, while the deep dives illustrate greater cooperation on 
devolved matters, existing arrangements for wider cooperation are weak, with little 
engagement of the devolved nations at international negotiations.  
3.3 Who speaks for Northern Ireland? 
Brexit preparations are unfolding even 
though Northern Ireland has been without 
either a functioning Northern Irish Executive 
or a sitting Assembly since January 2017. 
This means that while the Scottish and 
Welsh governments, and the Assembly for 
Wales and the Scottish Parliament, can 
organize consultations, hearings and 
inquiries to discuss what their positions 
should be on Brexit, no similar official 
forums exist in Northern Ireland. This is leading to a critical ‘deficit in leadership on the future 
of environmental governance’.30 Paradoxically, Northern Ireland is the most-discussed 
devolved nation in the UK-EU negotiations while simultaneously having no official voice 
during internal UK preparation, although the Democratic Unionist Party, whose 10 MPs 
                                               
27 Gallagher, J., 2012. Intergovernmental relations in the UK: co-operation, competition and constitutional 
change, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, p. 200. 
28 Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Scotland Office, 2018. Oral evidence 
given to the House of Lords, 25 January 2018.  
29 National Assembly for Wales, External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee, 2018. Scrutiny session 
with the Cabinet Secretary for Finance. 
30 Brennan, C., Dobbs, M., Gravey, V. and Uì Bhroin, A., 2018. The future of environmental governance in 
Northern Ireland, p. 3.  
“The absence of ministers 
constrains preparations in 
Northern Ireland as key actions—
such as putting out documents 
for consultation or making 
decisions—require ministerial 
assent.” 
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support the UK government in Westminster, can offer some indirect representation for part 
of the Northern Irish electorate.  
The absence of ministers means Northern Ireland is represented in the JMC by Northern Irish 
civil servants, not its own ministers. Northern Ireland’s influence in the JMC is already limited 
by its small size, a situation that is further exacerbated by the lack of a NI government. The 
absence of ministers also constrains preparations in Northern Ireland as key actions—such as 
putting out documents for consultation or making decisions—usually require ministerial 
assent. For example, civil servants in the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural 
Affairs (DAERA) have continued to convene stakeholder working groups (on fisheries, rural 
affairs, environment, agriculture etc.) set up after Brexit. But the absence of ministers means 
that the work of these groups can be difficult to make public (although this has started to 
change with the recent DAERA ‘public engagement exercise’ in future agricultural policy for 
Northern Ireland).31 Northern Irish civil servants’ narrow margins of manoeuvre have been 
clarified (and further constrained) by the NI Court of Appeal, which in July 2018 confirmed the 
annulment of a planning decision taken in the absence of ministers. It stated that: ‘Any 
decision which as a matter of convention or otherwise would normally go before the minister 
for approval lies beyond the competence of a senior civil servant in the absence of a 
minister.’32 Critically, the State Secretary for Northern Ireland, Karen Bradley MP, has 
indicated wanting to introduce legislation in Westminster to increase civil servants ability ‘to 
continue to take decisions in Northern Ireland in the public interest and to ensure the 
continued delivery of public services’ in the wake of the Court of Appeal ruling.33  This 
demonstrates on-going uncertainties about who governs Northern Ireland. 
In conclusion, Brexit preparations are putting great strains on intergovernmental institutions 
across the UK. The JMC is widely regarded as being unfit for purpose. Moreover, the absence 
of a government in Northern Ireland is limiting the ability of civil servant and stakeholders to 
engage meaningfully with the Brexit negotiations.     
                                               
31 Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs, 2018. DAERA seeks views on a 
future agricultural policy framework for NI.   
32 Rutter, T., 2018. Court dismisses appeal by NI civil servants over decision made without ministers. Civil 
Service World.  
33 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 2018. Oral statement to Parliament: Update on UK Government 
effort to restore the Northern Ireland Executive. 
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4. Governance after Brexit: 
Preserving both UK-wide 
and All-island Cooperation? 
The UK government has committed itself to a ‘Green Brexit’ and pushed ahead with the 
adoption of a 25 Year Environment Plan (25 YEP) and a governance and principles 
consultation to address concerns that Brexit could lead to an environmental governance gap 
and weaker environmental standards.34 However, neither the 25 YEP nor the consultation 
applied to the devolved nations. The way in which UK-wide environmental policy will be 
managed and enforced is still to be decided.  
These moves by the UK government have caused irritation within the devolved nations. The 
devolved administrations were given little notice of the UK government’s plans and the mode 
of consultation has been more in the style of telling the devolved administrations what the 
UK government’s plans are, with little if any opportunity to comment, rather than offering 
genuine opportunities for consultation and co-designed policy.  
4.1 Identifying scope for cooperation 
The JMC has agreed a set of principles (see Box 2) to guide post-Brexit policy.35 It has 
suggested that 145 policy areas will be allocated into three groups:36  
1. Areas where no further action is necessary (covering 49 areas including 9 related to 
environment and energy, such as water quality and land use); 
2. Areas that could require new non-legislative arrangements (covering 82 areas 
including 10 related to environment and energy, such as biodiversity and air quality); 
3. Areas that may require new common legislative frameworks (covering 24 areas 
including 19 related to environmental and energy, such as chemicals and pesticides). 
4. There are also 12 areas that the UK government believes should be reserved but which 
will still be subject to discussion with the devolved nations.  
                                               
34 HM Government, 2018. A green future: Our 25 Year Plan to improve the environment; Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2018. Environmental principles and governance after EU Exit. 
35 HM Government, 2017. Joint Ministerial Committee communique: 16 October 2017. 
36 HM Government, 2017. Joint Ministerial Committee communique: 12 December 2017. 
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The proposed frameworks offer some specific flexibility for Northern Ireland. The JMC 
agreement states that frameworks could apply to UK as a whole or to Great Britain only (and 
not Northern Ireland), opening the possibility for Northern Ireland to continue to follow a 
distinct approach. The common frameworks are ‘also subject to the need to find practical 
solutions that recognise the unique economic, social and political context of the land border 
between Northern Ireland and Ireland; frameworks will adhere to the Belfast Agreement’.37  
Box 2: JMC Principles for Common Frameworks (October 2017) 
1. Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to: 
• enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy 
divergence; 
• ensure compliance with international obligations; 
 • ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements 
and international treaties; 
• enable the management of common resources;  
• administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element;  
• safeguard the security of the UK. 
2. Frameworks will respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability 
of the devolved legislatures, and will therefore: 
• be based on established conventions and practices, including that the 
competence of the devolved institutions will not normally be adjusted without 
their consent; 
• maintain, as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific 
needs of each territory as is afforded by current EU rules; 
• lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers for the devolved 
administrations 
3. Frameworks will ensure recognition of the economic and social linkages between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland and that Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK that 
shares a land frontier with the EU. They will also adhere to the Belfast Agreement. 
Hence, Northern Ireland could theoretically choose between either continued North/South 
cooperation on certain environmental issues, participation in UK-wide Common Frameworks, 
                                               
37 HM Government, 2018. Frameworks analysis: breakdown of areas of EU law that intersect with devolved 
competence in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  
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or both. The possibility to be in both all-island and UK-wide frameworks is opened by the 
current very loose definition of what frameworks entail: 
“This may consist of common goals, minimum or maximum standards, harmonisation, 
limits on action, or mutual recognition, depending on the policy area and the 
objectives being pursued. Frameworks may be implemented by legislation, by 
executive action, by memorandums of understanding, or by other means depending 
on the context in which the framework is intended to operate” (JMC Conclusions, Oct 
2017) 
The allocation of policies to these groups has raised a set 
of concerns. First, it is unclear why some policy sectors 
have been allocated to particular groups: water policy is 
identified as an area where no further action is necessary 
despite the transboundary implications of water use and 
pollution. There also seems to have been little 
consideration of how to manage the interaction 
between policies covered by legislative frameworks (such as chemicals) and those that are 
not (such as water).38  
The Environmental Audit Committee noted that whilst, there is no indication that the current 
UK government would seek to weaken regulation, there is also no guarantee that future 
governments would not do so.39 Therefore, failing to put in place legislative frameworks 
leaves the environment vulnerable over the longer term. This is particularly the case in 
Northern Ireland, where environmental governance is already weaker. 
4.2 Governing frameworks 
In the on-going discussions around the future of environmental governance in the UK, the 
devolved nations are faced with four shared challenges: 
 
                                               
38 See National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change and Rural Affairs Committee, 2018. Common 
frameworks for the environment after Brexit; Gravey, V. 2018. Written evidence provided to the Welsh 
Assembly Climate Change, Environment and Rural Affairs Committee inquiry into UK common frameworks 
on agriculture and the environment. 
39 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 2018. The Government’s 25 Year Plan for the 
Environment. Eighth Report of Session 2017–19. HC 803.  
 
“failing to put in place 
legislative frameworks 
leaves the environment 
vulnerable over the longer 
term” 
 
 
 
20 
 
1. Striking the balance between diverging freely and influencing UK-wide developments 
While divergence may become possible across a wide range of issues, the respective market 
sizes may make it extremely costly for e.g. Wales to diverge from England, or Northern 
Ireland to diverge from Great Britain. This raises the prospect that the bigger market, 
England, risks setting the terms of trade.  
This issue is compounded by the fact that devolved competences may increase, but they will 
remain severely constrained by choices made in London. Trade, immigration but also the 
overall UK-EU deal and what parts of the EU acquis and institutions the UK stays in are all 
under the remit of the UK government (subject to the results of the negotiations with the 
EU).  
2. Ensuring devolved concerns are heard in the design of common frameworks 
Participation in UK-wide common legislative frameworks does not offer a guarantee that the 
devolved nations’ concerns will be heard. The April 2018 Inter-governmental Agreement 
signed between the Welsh and the UK governments sets out a process for creating legislative 
common frameworks.40 Building on the civil service led ‘deep dives’, the legislation would be 
drafted by the UK government, after which the devolved administrations would be given 40 
days to grant consent. If consent is withheld, the regulations could still be agreed if the UK 
Parliament voted in their favour (after being presented by explanatory documents from both 
the UK government and devolved legislatures which refused consent). This raises questions 
of a balance of power between executives and legislatures—with devolved legislatures only 
able to grant consent, not amend. It further raises concerns about participation and 
stakeholder engagement, leaving only 40 days for devolved legislatures to consult before 
deciding. 
Beyond the adoption of frameworks, it is unclear how they will be implemented and how 
disputes between parties will be settled. Currently, political and financial agreements 
between devolved and central government are supposed to be settled through the JMC 
(with the arbitration of a senior UK minister), while legal disagreements are settled by the 
Supreme Court.41 Yet in practice, disputes are mostly settled informally. This approach is 
highly problematic because it lacks transparency, and because of the dual role of UK 
ministers in arbitrating the dispute (the UK government being both judge and party).  
                                               
40 UK Government and Welsh Government, 2018. Intergovernmental Agreement on the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill and the establishment of common frameworks. 
41 Torrance, D., 2018. Intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom. London: House of Commons Library.  
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3. Resources will remain limited, acting as a de facto constraint on divergence  
While divergence in some areas may be useful to achieve environmental aims, developing 
new policies from scratch for 140 new areas of responsibility (in the case of Northern Ireland) 
risks submerging the smallest of the three devolved administrations. For years, DAERA had 
seen its staff cut. This has meant limited staff members available to deal with Brexit. 
Speaking in March, the head of Northern Ireland’s Civil Service stated that compared to the 
1,200 staff working on Brexit in Defra, DAERA was “barely able to muster 30 people to do 
similar work”.42 While staff numbers for Brexit preparation are increasing through the 
(contested43) application of the Barnett formula to the recent large increase in staff in 
Whitehall, Northern Ireland will remain a small administration faced with a growing number 
of responsibilities. These challenges come at a time when the Renewable Heat Incentive 
inquiry is raising profound questions about the quality of governance in the region.  This 
means picking areas of divergence carefully—and carrying over legislation from other parts of 
the UK equally carefully.   The ‘opportunity costs’ of Brexit—the resources (staff, money and 
time) that will be necessary to undertake the administrative challenge of carrying it out—are 
also considerable.44 
For Northern Ireland, a further dilemma emerges. As the weakest link in UK environmental 
governance, closer cooperation with the other three UK nations is more likely to mean the 
pursuit of higher environmental ambition. In contrast, looser cooperation may lead to a 
situation where NI politicians are tempted to continue ignoring environmental challenges. 
However, putting in place looser arrangements would also make it easier to continue 
North/South cooperation on key environmental matters. Moreover, the current UK 
government seems comfortable with a less ambitious set of policies for Northern Ireland. 
Speaking to the NI Affairs Committee in July 2018, Defra Minister George Eustice MP 
explained that while English agricultural support would shift towards a ‘public money for 
public goods’ model, Northern Ireland ‘might want to be more cautious about the pace of 
change and it will be open to them (sic) to do that’.45 
                                               
42 BBC Radio Ulster, 2018. Is there a stand-off between the secretary of state and the head of the Civil Service 
over abuse victims? 
43 Gourtsoyan, P., 2018. SNP accuses Westminster of short-changing Scotland over Brexit fund. The 
Scotsman, 13 March. 
44 National Audit Office, 2017. Implementing the UK’s exit from the European Union: The Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 
45 House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 2018. Oral evidence. Brexit and Northern Ireland: 
Agriculture.  
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4.3 Addressing the Brexit governance gaps 
New institutions will be required for environmental policy development, implementation and 
enforcement after Brexit. 
1. Policy development 
Policy development has largely been centred on Brussels where the European Commission 
formulates policy in its Directorates General (DGs) for the Environment and Climate Action. 
After Brexit such policy-making power will rest within the UK but is likely to be dispersed 
across the devolved nations (depending upon agreement about common frameworks and 
the supreme court ruling on Scotland’s Continuity Bill). 
The UK contributes to and benefits from the European Environment Agency (EEA), which 
gathers comparable cross-national data to inform EU and national policy development and 
implementation.  Whilst the UK government has expressed a preference to participate in 
some agencies, it has not included the EEA in that list.46 There is consequently on-going 
uncertainty about whether and how the UK will gather environmental data. This means scope 
for different types of data being used to inform policy development and implementation 
across the UK. Data collection and sharing also matters for citizens’ rights to environmental 
information under the Aarhus convention (and guaranteed in the EU Withdrawal Act). 
Diverging data collection practices could detrimentally impact the exercise of this right. 
2. Compliance and accountability 
EU institutions such as the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) provide ways to hold member state and devolved governments to account and to 
settle environmental disputes. For example, between 2003 and 2016 the Commission 
brought 29 cases against the UK on environmental matters, 24 of which resulted in a 
judgment wholly or partly against the UK government. Notably, these cases represent almost 
half of all the Court’s judgments on UK infringements, thereby illustrating the importance of 
such legal mechanisms for enforcing environmental policy.47 In Northern Ireland, where 
                                               
46 HM Government, 2018. The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, pp. 
8-10. 
47 Hogarth, R. and Lloyd, L., 2017. Who’s afraid of the ECJ? Charting the UK’s relationship with the European 
Court. Institute for Government. 
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officials ‘always operate with the risk of infraction from the Commission’48, six EU 
environmental infringement cases were ongoing at the time of the EU referendum.  
Once the UK leaves the EU it will need to develop its own mechanisms to hold government to 
account and to resolve problems around the interpretation of common frameworks.49 Defra’s 
governance and principles consultation suggests a new watchdog but the current proposals 
have been widely derided for being too weak. They also do not apply to the UK, but rather to 
England alone, meaning that the way in which the body will coordinate with the devolved 
nations is uncertain. There is scope for the new body to work with equivalent bodies in 
Northern Ireland, but it is uncertain which bodies will assume monitoring and enforcement 
powers.  Furthermore, the distinct status of NIEA—it is not independent as its Scottish, Welsh 
and English equivalents are, even if their independence has been undermined over time—
raises further questions as to how the new, independent watchdog would cooperate with the 
agency.  
In addition, it is unclear whether and to what extent members of the public and civil society 
organisations will be able to use such bodies to secure the implementation and enforcement 
of environmental policy in line with the Aarhus Convention.50 While the EU Withdrawal Act 
lists the Aarhus principles of participation, access to information and justice as key 
environmental principles for the UK, the Aarhus Convention compliance committee found 
the four UK nations wanting in 2014. It reiterated its condemnation in 2017 stressing the need 
to ‘reduce financial barriers to access to justice’, especially in relation to the allocation of 
costs which should be ‘fair and equitable and not prohibitively expensive’.51  
It also remains to be decided how any new body would be held to account. There is a strong 
presumption in favour of legislative accountability. The question then arises as to which 
legislatures should be involved. Particular arrangements should be made for Northern 
Ireland.  First, the Assembly should create, as suggested by many existing reviews, its own 
Environmental Audit Committee for such situations. Second, alternative accountability 
mechanisms should be set up in the case of a break-down in devolution such as collaboration 
                                               
48 Northern Ireland Assembly, 2016. Official report: Minutes of evidence, Committee for Agriculture, 
Environment and Rural Affairs, meeting on Thursday, 16 June 2016, p. 3. 
49 Lee, M., 2017. The UK needs a new independent body to protect the environment after Brexit. Brexit & 
Environment Blog. 
50 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, n.d. Public Participation. 
51 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2017. Decision VI/8k: Compliance by United Kingdom 
with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention. 
 
 
 
24 
 
between the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee and the Environmental Audit Committee in 
the House of Commons.  
If a UK-wide watchdog is developed there is a case for the House of Commons holding the 
body to account. If a series of watchdogs are developed there is a case for each legislature 
holding each watchdog to account. If a mixed (4+1) system is adopted, with, for example, an 
Environment Commissioner in each of the nations as part of a UK-wide body, both levels 
could be included. Hence, a cross-national committee comprising representatives from each 
of the four legislatures could also be used to review and hold to account either a UK-wide 
watchdog with cross-national powers or a group of watchdogs.  
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5. Future Directions  
Northern Ireland’s environmental governance has long lagged behind the rest of the UK. 
Brexit offers an opportunity to rethink how the UK governs its environment. The UK 
government’s pledge to deliver ‘gold standard’ environmental governance appears 
ambitious—but for now only concerns England. Together with the absence of a Northern 
Ireland Executive, this creates two likely options for Northern Ireland: either muddling 
through with no changes to its ‘systemic governance failures’ which are likely to grow worse; 
or adopt a new governance system, developed by and for England, only becoming common 
by default.  
Environmental problems do not respect borders. Showing leadership in the environmental 
field requires cross-border cooperation—both within the UK and between the UK and its 
closest neighbours: Ireland and the rest of the EU. Creative solutions are required to make 
sure the UK’s environment does not become a victim of either failed UK-EU negotiations or 
internal UK constitutional stalemate. This is why a third option is needed: a truly co-designed 
UK-wide environmental governance system which encourages a race to the top in 
environmental ambition and recognizes the specificities of each of the UK’s four nations.  
Cooperation cannot—and should not—be imposed from the top. Across the UK, the 
stakeholders we met testified to the lack of trust between the central and devolved 
governments. Such co-design will take time. Agreeing on common frameworks requires 
agreeing on which institutions will design them, how they will be designed and how disputes 
between parties will be resolved. For Northern Ireland in particular, it also means deciding 
where and how cooperation on environmental matters will continue or even intensify with 
Ireland. 
5.1 Recommendations 
Northern Ireland is in a unique situation in the Brexit process. The absence of a sitting 
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive hampers the representation of Northern Irish 
interests in UK-wide talks. It also undermines the development of a much needed 4-nations 
approach to tackle shared Brexit challenges and opportunities.   
Key decisions, such as whether and how Northern Ireland should participate in common 
frameworks or a common environmental watchdog, will need to be made in the coming 
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months. These decisions need to be informed by a wide range of stakeholders and made by 
politicians, not civil servants. If the stalemate in Stormont continues, key decisions may need 
to be made by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. If so, a future Northern Ireland 
Executive should have the power to reverse or amend those decisions.  
Based on discussions with stakeholders, we have identified a set of recommendations: 
1.  As a matter of priority, all 4 nations must work together to reach agreement on how 
to align their respective environmental policy ambitions in ways that respect the 
environment and facilitate intra-UK commerce. Such an agreement should be 
genuinely co-designed.  
2. Common UK frameworks must be created. There should be a presumption in favour of 
transparent legislative frameworks underpinned by common standards and principles 
to avoid gaps in implementation and to create the conditions for successful policy 
coordination and cooperation.   
3. These common frameworks must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate continued 
cooperation between Northern Ireland and Ireland on a North/South basis under the 
umbrella of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in policy areas such as water quality, 
animal welfare etc.  
4. This flexibility must be underpinned by an intra-UK non-regression principle, 
irrespective of what is agreed with the EU. This would enable each nation to diverge 
upward, yet prevent an internal ‘race to the bottom’ across the nations of the UK. 
5. The Joint Ministerial Council is unfit for purpose and should be reformed to allow 
parity for the devolved nations. Sufficient notice should be given of policy 
developments and the process should be genuinely consultative. A reformed JMC 
should have a) at least as much transparency as the Council of the EU and b) a clear 
dispute resolution settlement overseen by an independent body. 
6. While UK-wide discussions focus on making UK environmental governance 'Brexit 
proof', Northern Ireland requires further reforms to inure environmental governance to 
current and future break-downs in the Executive. An independent environment 
agency should be established as a matter of urgency (to further align Northern Ireland 
with best practice in environmental governance) and a separate environment 
commissioner should be appointed who can sit on an UK-wide environmental 
watchdog (4+1 model).  
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7. A Northern Ireland Environment Commissioner within a broader UK infrastructure 
would provide Northern Irish stakeholders with a much-needed sense of ownership 
over environmental policy after Brexit, and ensure that the future environmental 
watchdog is aware of local challenges.  
8. The new watchdog(s) must be transparent, accountable and provide access to 
citizens.  
9. Citizens living in Northern Ireland that have suffered negative environmental 
consequences from policies in one of the other nations of the UK should be able to 
raise environmental issues with the watchdog in that nation and vice versa.  
10. Whatever type of watchdog is adopted, it must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny 
and accountability.  
11. Methods of reporting and accountability should also plan for the absence of a 
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. The director of a future independent 
environment agency and an environment commissioner should be asked to present 
annual reports to either the relevant Northern Ireland Assembly Committee or to a 
joint committee made up of members of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee and 
the Environmental Audit Committee in the House of Commons. 
12. Environmental policy must be properly resourced to enable the development of new 
policies and the implementation and enforcement of existing policies. 
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